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PUBLIC SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVANTS IN SSA: 
Capacity, Competence, Conscience and Competence
B y R eg in a ld  H erbold  G reen
Probable possible my black hen 
She lays eggs in the relative when 
She doesn't lay eggs in the positive now 
Because she's unable to postulate how.
- Anon
W e must appoint a comm ittee...
A com m ittee o f  inquiry...
One secretary will do for several committees...
And the rising cry o f  the people 
resign! Resign!! RESIGN!!!
- 'Fragm ents o f  an Ode for a Statesman' 
T. S. Eliot
It has often been said that nationalism is the 
last resort o f  a scoundrel. In Africa today 
Africanness and authenticity are often the last 
resort o f  a failing neo-colonial dictator.
- Philip N degw a
I.
A C U LT U R E OF CAPABILITY
G ood governance requires the capacity to deliver. N o amount o f  participation even allied to  
political will can produce what the w om an in the field or market or the man on the shop floor 
or the street considers good governance without the capability to articulate and to deliver.
The ordinary citizen - in SSA as elsewhere - w ants peace and security to go about daily life; 
access to education-health-pure water; ability to  reach and to participate in reasonably 
unrigged markets; a climate o f  taxation, extension services and access to inputs (knowledge,
land, credit, jobs, etc.) enabling earning a decent livelihood. The dom inant bottom  up view o f 
good governance is w hether or not these are provided.
This is not to  say participation in decisions, transparency, accountability, freedom  o f  speech 
do not matter. Their absence is usually the hallmark o f  repressive d ictatorships or Platonic 
G uardians whose concern "for the people" may be highly different from  what "the people" 
actually want or need. That absence - in Africa or elsewhere - creates the conditions for 
m ounting discontent demanding change - often violent change. But unless there is capability, 
the resultant governm ent even if decent, well intentioned and listening will not be well 
regarded. By its absence o f  w orks it will be judged and condemned.
B u r e a u c r a c y  (P r o c e d u r e ) A s C o n v e y o r  B el t
It is fashionable to denounce bureaucracy as user unfriendly or as 'non-African'. In part this 
represents simply transform ing a technical term into an epithet and in part a confusion between 
context and culture.
Bureaucracy - in the W eberian analytical tradition - is about setting up a set o f  parameters  
(e.g. standing orders) to ensure routine decisions are taken promptly, uniformly, 
efficiently at field level. M ore complex cases are referred up - as few levels as possible - 
leaving senior officials time for designing guidelines for new activities and for in-depth 
attention to policy. "Post bureaucratic" argum ents for flexibility in fact assum e a functioning 
bureaucracy so there is time for flexibility and consultation on non-routine cases.
Bureaucracy need not mean deprofessionalisation. An extension w orker, a prim ary school 
teacher, a medical aid should be professionally educated and w orking in a system  calling on 
her/him  to  act professionally in the field, the classroom , or the clinic. W hat standing orders do 
- or should do - is to free time to  do just that by reducing time needed to  deal w ith routine 
adm inistration and/or having to  refer everything up for decision.
In this sense, bureaucracy is not the main problem o f  most SSA governm ents - quite the 
reverse. There is bad bureaucracy and multiple layers o f  orders and checks which are very 
user - and time - unfriendly, but systems with no standing order m odels to  allow 
decentralisation and with decisions not made, done totally inconsistently o r referred up (so 
Perm anent Secretaries sign petrol chits and allocate hourly vehicle use) are exam ples o f  the 
high cost o f  no bureaucracy.
Is bureaucracy then "un-African"? In the sense that pre-color.ial states (and until very late 
most colonial as well) did not have large civil services, Africa and Africans have limited 
bureaucratic history. M ost public servants/bureaucrats are teachers, nurses, extension 
workers, civilian police and m agistrates, road and w ater technicians and artisans. Until
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delivery o f  these services to all or most citizens becam e a staple governm ent activity (in the 
late 19th Century even in Europe and North America,, albeit earlier in China and some other 
areas in Asia during periods o f  strong governance) there were few public servants and 
especially few scattered field level ones. Thus there was little bureaucracy needed or possible. 
This situation can be overstated. The Code o f  Hammurabi and some Pharaonic Egyptian and 
Rom an Edicts are in practice standing orders - with special emphasis on constabulary, 
magisterial and tax collection functions.
But Africans and African societies do set value - often very high value - on order and on 
predictability Custom ary codes are about "how it should be done" to  ensure equity and 
consistency. In that sense the basic purpose o f  bureaucracy is African - if  only because it is 
human rather than culture specific.
P u b l i c  S e r v ic e s  N e e d  P u b l ic  S e r v a n t s
Stated in that way, the need for public servants in order to have public services - and trained, 
com m itted ones to have reasonable quality public services (especially under constraints o f  
limited resources) may appear self-evident. But if  one studies civil service and public service 
reform  literature one cannot help but feel that the focus on public servants is often, at best, 
diffuse. Institutional structures, productivity schemes o f  great complexity and opaqueness, 
picking numbers to  be "redeployed" (m ade unemployed) on external budget criteria w ith little 
attention to targeted service delivery levels (and their staff requirements) or to  the difference 
betw een overstaffing and retraining and/or replacing non-com petent staff holding posts which 
are necessary, all appear to receive disproportionate, even dominant, attention.
Further, the balance o f  attention between the top 1% to 3% o f  senior policy alternative 
presenting, decision advising, policy/operation articulating and monitoring, analytical and 
inspectoral staff'and the - say - 75% o f  non-military personnel who are basic service  
providers is disproportionately biased tow ard the form er (perhaps 75% to 1% in the opposite  
direction!). The reasons are probably threefold: a) a public service w ithout a top level 
capacity to  inform strategy and to articulate its implementation will not be very successful; b) 
top level posts are intellectually m ore interesting (especially to economists); c) the advisors 
and consultants (especially, but not only, the foreign ones) are literally and culturally much 
closer to  the senior personnel.
The problem  is not primarily the attention to  senior posts and personnel. It is the apparent 
failure to  realise that education cannot function w ithout competent, motivated primary school 
teachers (and field level inspectors); law and order (household and individual security) cannot 
be m aintained without constables and m agistrates committed and equipped (in training and 
time as well as o ther resources) to do so; no tax system however econometrically sound,
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bureaucratically logical and efficiently structured institutionally can actually raise the revenue 
due unless field level tax collectors understand their duties and seek to  fulfil them.
N o  Pa y  - N o  P r o d u c t i v i t y
"W hat you pay for is what you get" is not quite a truism - you may be cheated. But what you 
do not pay for you rarely get. As the 1980s Polish civil servants put it: "The governm ent 
pretends to  pay us and we pretend to work".
The idea o f  a general pattern of overpaid public servants in SSA w as always overblow n and 
over-generalised. Today it is - with a few exceptions - ludicrous. A 1995 U N D P/U N IC EF 
study headed by Adebayo Adedeji found that in five SSA countries (M ozam bique, Tanzania, 
Rwanda, Ethiopia, M ali) many basic service professionals and skilled w orkers received $25-50 
a m onth w hereas households o f  six absolute poverty lines ranged from  $60-125 a month. 
Roughly com parable medium and large scale private sector posts paid 3 to  5 tim es as much 
(up to  8 tim es for UN agency local stafi).
Those levels suggest that - perforce - many African public servants have to  act on the Polish 
comment. They have to cope: be absent from workplace to earn; be at w orkplace but do 
private business; charge decentralised privatised user fees; engage in co rrup t activities (e.g. 
one-quarter tax for governm ent, one-quarter for 'collector', one-half fo r 'taxpayer'). The direct 
impact on services - and especially poor people's access to  them - is evident and the 
dow nw ard multiplier or divider via tax non-collection forcing w ages dow n yet further is not 
analytically hard to  grasp.
At senior levels the situation is more diverse partly because opaque, unequal and usually 
inequitable allowances have multiplied to allow visible lowest to highest pay ratios o f  6 to  10 
to  one and to  conceal actual ones o f  up to  90 to  1. But even so the num ber o f  senior 
personnel receiving over $250 a month is very small and - excluding 'unofficial' o r 'informal 
sector' incom es - o f  those receiving over $1,000 a m onth minute. A scale w ith a 10:1 
top /bottom  ratio and the floor for basic services providers tw o-thirds the household o f  six 
absolute poverty line ($400-8000 a m onth at the top and $40-80 at the bo ttom ) w ould (except 
in E thiopia w hose 1993 reforms have moved teaching and begun m oving o ther services to 
approxim ately that pattern) double pay for about 90%  o f  public servants (even if  allowances 
w ere limited to  genuine job  required cost reimbursement and - perhaps - housing at 15% o f  
pay) and reduce it for a small fraction o f  1%.
Low  pay - relative to  the absolute poverty line and to the private sector - is not efficient.
Loss o f productivity per person month m ore than affects lower person cost per m onth. To 
restore productivity, probity and professionalism first and then pay accordingly is literally an
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impossible scenario. M ost public servants cannot afford to work full time, honestly and 
w ithout charging private fees for public services. Oddly, the exceptions tend to be rural - 
because o ther household members can grow  food and build housing and/or because if  the 
public servant is serving, the service users often can and will provide food, time to help with 
crops, hom e building and maintenance because they know someone must pay him/her for the 
services to  continue and the state is not doing it.
P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  a n d  Po l i t i c s : M e a n in g  W h a t ?
The debate on clashes betw een professionalism and politics is confusing (perhaps because 
confused) especially in Anglophone Africa:
a decisions on strategy - and often on policy - are by their nature political,
b. but they should be informed by public service analysis of alternatives and their probable 
direct and indirect costs and benefits,
c. which probably does mean a political decision taker needs a handful o f  top advisers and 
analysts w ho broadly share his/her outlook and - more problematically - some top 
adm inistrators he can trust to articulate - implement - m onitor decision implem entation 
(rather than to  block it by inertia or transform  it into what the public servant feels should 
have been decided).
Those elem ents suggest a Francophone Cabinet du M inistre system or a modified British one 
in which the particular postings o f  the top 1% (or less) o f  public servants (though not their 
prom otion to  or continued employment at those levels) are political as well as professional 
decisions. That is not - pace civil servants who apparently really believe in political servants 
and professional m asters - an attack on professionalism.
Detailed political intervention on professional issues is perhaps rarer than supposed. In 
Tanzania the typical cases cited were o f  differences on goals (e.g. 30 to 1 versus 10 to  1 pay 
scales) o r lateral transfers o f  senior civil servants who either could not develop harm onious 
relations with M inisters or who were fairly unambiguously unsuccessful but not (under the 
rather strict civil service regulations) incom petent or delinquent enough to fire. In E thiopia 
the bulk o f  middle and upper level civil servants had careers progressing normally across the 
Im perial-D ergue-Revolutionary Governm ent divides. Mengistu did impose nominal party 
membership as a key to  prom otion, but neither active membership nor informing nor even 
recasting the public service to  fit the particular goals o f  the Dergue was either com pulsory or 
common. Even when the new governm ent - briefly - dismissed all 'Party' members only about 
3% o f  public servants were impacted and that number was reduced by nine-tenths when actual 
'Party' activist roles were substituted for nominal membership as the disqualifying criteria. The
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political action before reflection did have costs in term s o f  morale, dislocation and cleared
public servants who chose not to  return. "Don't just do something Think it ou t first" has
much to be said for it as a maxim for political decision takers as well as for public servants.
H ow ever, at least six very real problem s do exist:
1 corrupt politicians force public servants to be corrupt. Corruption, as used here, 
includes appointm ents and prom otions made for reasons other than, and inconsistent with, 
the public interest. In a basically non-corrupt system this can be (often is) resisted by 
referring up in the public service and across to  top political decision takers. B ut if  the 
system (or som e large chunk o f  it) is corrupt a very real problem exists. H ow ever, it is not 
one o f  professionalism  but o f  corruption and ultimately one for public (preferably 
electoral) pressure;
2. politicians do not always seek or use information and, therefore, m ake very problem atic 
(or pretty clearly unsound) decisions;
3. both politicians and public servants do believe that knowledge is pow er and seek to 
monopolise it. The "need to know" principle is anti participatory, anti accountability 
and anti dem ocratic in the UK as in Singapore, in Uganda as in C ote  d'Ivoire. The 
transform ation to  a principle "need to make known unless clear and present public  
harm would demonstrably result" is hard to achieve in SSA as it is elsewhere This 
is a cultural problem  but the culture o f  secrecy is hardly unique to Africa. In its m ore 
extrem e form s the same know ledge is pow er principle "justifies" holding back data  from  
other public servants and political decision takers and ultimately and pathologically for 
state and society in seeing public information as a key source o f  private pow er and profit 
(a perception exemplified in the North by insider trading and contract rigging);
4. public sector penury (w hether no pay and/or no complementary resources to  do the job), 
corruption (rendering honest analysis and advice nugatory or at best secondary) and 
oppression w hether random  or systematic are ultimately political and cultural and do 
erode or even destroy public service morale, morality, professionalism  and capacity 
w hether in Serbia o r Burma, Bolivia or Burundi,
5. perceived external control over national decisions, an overkill o f  parallel donor and 
N G O  delivery channels and excessive expatriate personnel and a perception that 
foreign advice and advisers are automatically preferred to  dom estic do ultimately 
demoralise, decapacitate and deprofessionalise public servants. N o m atter how  benign the 
foreign intentions or those o f  dom estic decision takers who go along with them , such a 
cultural-political pattern creates a downward dynamic recreating and deepenimr
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w eaknesses in the capacity to  decide and to deliver it seeks to cure. In a relatively strong 
state  "Have a headache? Take tw o expatriates!" may do little harm, in a weak one it is 
necessary to rem em ber overdoses o f  aspirin are toxic. The external and internal political 
cultures o f  neo-Platonic neo-colonialism and o f  accepting external guidance and 
responsibility are anti professional in W ashington and in Bonn, in Manila and in Port o f  
Spain, in D akar and in Accra. They are also addictive;
6. civil servants' own interests (including in procedures and accountability) can be in 
tension with other aspects o f  public interests, e.g. reducing gender bias, m aking 
providers accountable to  users, deploying staff to  rem ote rural areas. In such cases proper 
(or at least arguably proper) political decisions will certainly not please public servants and 
may well be seen as 'anti professional'.
W h ic h  C u l t u r e  C l a s h e s ? Fo r  W h o s e  E n d s ?
To claim that public service as a professional means to facilitate decisions in the public interest 
and the delivery o f  public services o f  acceptable quality and quantity to  the public is 
inconsistent with African cultures is either nonsensical, self-exculpatory or racist. It tells m ore 
about the frustration, weak observation, racism o r personal purpose o f  the asserter than about 
Africa, Africans, public servants or public service. In fairness, the commonest m otivation may 
well be despair - the number o f  failures in public services (in both senses) in SSA is appalling.
The previous sections do set out a num ber o f  culture clashes from secrecy versus 
accountability and external guidance versus responsible self-reliance to  public service versus 
private gain These clashes are very real, are cultural and exist in SSA. But none is in any  
unique way African. Posing problem s to  Africans in Africa, yes. Reasons African states 
cannot have professional, proficient public'services, public processes and public deliveries o f  
services to meet public requirem ents, no.
Certainly there are contextual differences. U nadapted and unexamined imports in this secto r 
are no more (indeed rather less) likely to  be functional (let alone optimal) than in o ther 
sectors. But that is hardly unique to  public services or to Africa. What is rather m ore 
surprising is how well only m oderately adapted public services functioned - in term s o f  policy 
advising and o f  service delivery - in several African countries up to 1980, and how resilient 
som e have proven in the face o f  adversity. N or is it likely to be accidental that civil service 
reform /renewal discussion in Addis Ababa, Asm ara and Hargeisa has hauntingly familiar 
overtones to  those who participated in similar dialogues in Accra or Lagos in the early, o r 
Nairobi and D ar es Salaam in the late, 1960s. W hat is being sought - often by men and 
(occasionally) wom en with no personal background in colonial or immediate post colonial
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public services - is very clearly a m oderately adapted and more professional/less adm inistrative 
variant on a (som ew hat idealised) model o f la te  colonial British public service.
That similar nostalgia is not so evident in D akar or M aputo is unsurprising. Senegal inherited 
an overload o f  expensive senior personnel from a defunct regional governm ent and also pay 
scales tied to French ones that prevented any drive toward universal access to  any services 
(beyond a state security focused gendarm erie and a law -order-taxation centred set o f  local 
outposts o f  central administration). Portuguese colonial administration in practice - as 
opposed to on paper - was ad hoc, arbitrary and - to the bitter end - anti African in a way 
British and French w ere not. Further, no independent Lusophone African state inherited a 
functioning system nor an historic mem ory embodied in a substantial hold over cadre 
(expatriate or citizen) o f  middle and senior public servants.
Arguments that African societies are based on affinity and have no broader public  
accountability principles or obligations simply do not square either with most historic 
records or many present observations. Affinity - family, social g roup, cultural - is an 
influence anywhere and not inherently a malign one. "Old boy netw orks" (literally - one o f  
their problem s is that they tend to perpetuate historic male dom inance) do serve to  provide 
reasonably com petent candidates with whom  incumbents know they can w ork - neither an 
insignificant positive factor. The problem  - in SSA or anywhere else - is ensuring public 
services do have equal access for equally com petent persons. As the w indrow s o f  anti­
nepotism and equal opportunity regulations and laws in the N orth indicate, this is not simple 
anywhere.
Similarly, the argum ents that hum an rights, pluralism (in the sense o f  multiple social sector 
organisations), checks and balances and accountability of leaders are alien concepts to  
Africans is either based on a handful o f  special cases, an ill-advised attem pt to  find direct 
replication o f  an external observer's home country verbal and institutional, racism, a desire to 
exculpate the self-interest o f  authoritarian rulers or despairing confusion.
The African C harter o f  Human and Peoples' Rights and Responsibilities is both recognisably 
within the broad stream  o f  the conceptual evolution o f  universal hum an rights and 
recognisably African. It does place greater stress than historic Northern form ulations on 
rights o f  persons and groups o f  persons within society and it does link rights and  
reciprocal obligations in ways which are culturally African But in doing so it arguably is 
in the advance guard o f  current global evolution o f  rights thinking. Certainly it is logically 
stronger in setting param eters for public servants.
Similarly, in Africa - as in Asia, in Latin America and in Europe - there  are leaders w ho believe 
in Platonic Guardianship - deciding for the people not accountability to or decisions by
them . So long as their states do deliver and are neither wildly inconsistent nor ubiquitously 
oppressive, these leaders may well have the passive support o f many o f  their subjects. That 
again is - at least historically - a universal not an African phenomenon. And the breadth, depth 
and unconditionality o f  popular acceptance o f  such doctrines is open to doubt - such leaders 
(w hether in Singapore or Uganda, the Dominican Republic or Kenya) are not prone to 
allowing either "level playing field" elections or in depth, confidential interview analysis o f  
people's views by independent observers.
Certainly, public services - and indeed the articulation o f  the concept o f  public service - 
involves culture. Equally certainly it involves cultural tensions (both bureaucracy and 
universal access to basic services are societal/cultural constructs and fairly recent ones at that). 
Certainly these vary with historical, geographic and resource availability contexts which 
do - and should - influence both form and substance. But to describe these realities as an 
inconsistency between African culture (more accurately cultures o f  Africans) and 
modern public services, is to misrepresent
II.
G O O D  G O V E R N A N C E  A S BASIC SERVICE DELIVERY
From  the perspective o f  the field, the street, the shop and the workplace - if not necessarily 
State House, university or consultancy firm - good governance is very largely about  
delivery of basic services in user friendly ways by public services perceived as broadly  
within the same socio political and cultural ethos as the users Assuming a viable state, 
this does imply a precondition o f  independence and o f  a government not dominated by a 
narrow  clique.
Basic services can be summarised as:
1. Peace, Security and Certainty - constables, magistrates, laws and practices to ensure 
ordinary people can go about their lives w ithout arbitrary interference and especially 
w ithout being the victims o f  violence (private or public) and confidence that violators will 
at the least be deterred and - preferably - sought for, found and subjected to sanctions (not 
left to themselves, overlooked and/or sanctioned in the sense o f  licensed or approved).
2 Education - primary, applied, adult- perceived as both relevant to household and local 
aspirations (including, but not limited to, enhanced livelihoods), adequate in quality to  be 
serviceable and delivered in user friendly (as to location, cost and - especially for adults - 
style o f  teacher/student interaction) modes.
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3. Basic Health Services - preventative, educational, primary curative and linked 
agro/nutritional - again accessible (as to location and cost), serviceable and respectful o f  
patients/students.
4. W ater - household (including human, livestock and crop with different relative stress in 
different contexts) supplies accessible at acceptable cost (including opportunity  costs o f  
going to  and transporting it and o f  maintaining facilities).
5. Food security - in respect to ability to  produce (land access, relevant extension services) 
and to reliable safety nets, e.g. w ork for food, food for work and/or ration distribution 
program m es when natural (e.g. drought or flood) or manmade (e.g. w ar) events prevent 
production (o f  food and o f  o ther income sources).
6. Access to physical infrastructure - especially roads and bridges, as well as the 
infrastructure for the services listed earlier. The opportunity cost o f  walking to  roads and 
the cash cost o f  buying or - especially - selling other than on roads are frequently very high 
in rural areas and those o f  isolation (by physical gaps or costs) from  central w orkplaces 
and m arkets are often nearly as high in cities.
7. Access to markets - goes beyond physical infrastructure. It is the business o f  the state to 
ensure that poor households are not - as producers and as consum ers - exploited by 
collusive oligopsonies and oligopolies (private, public or licensed quasi social sector such 
as many co-ops). W hat this requires varies widely - e.g. access to  transport, to  credit, to 
places to  buy and to  sell for small to  medium rural based enterprises are often relevant and 
in agriculture geographic and floor price buyers o f  last resort and catastrophe price 
capping stock ow ners (not necessarily operators) may be as well.
B a s ic  S e r v i c e s , T h e  St a t e  a n d  T h e  S o c ia l  S e c t o r
There is a very strong pragm atic and moral case for public sector provision o f  these services:
a. all are characterised by economies o f  scale (e.g. one primary teacher w ith a class o f  30 
versus 3 tutored pupils, mass produced versus limited run texts);
b. all involve heavy up-front expenditure for cumulatively larger future (up to  lifetime 
especially in respect to  education, health and nutrition) gains. Therefore, given the radical 
imperfection o f  credit m arkets, any full cost present payment system will exclude poor 
households and especially poor children and women;
c universal access provision cannot be made profitable and therefore  cannot be provided 
primarily through private m arket mechanisms.
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Each o f  these considerations is global but each applies with special force in Africa.
U nless the state is the dominant strategist and financial provider, universal service access in 
Africa is and will remain a daydream (as it would have in the USA, the UK or Sweden). It is 
possible to  envisage substantial dom estic social sector roles in actual service provision (e.g. by 
churches, m osques, temples, women's groups, trade unions, civic associations) and some by 
private enterprises, but only within a state designed and m onitored context. The most 
successful dom estic social sector operations (e.g. in health and education in Ghana, Namibia 
and Tanzania and in nutrition by local wom en's groups in Tanzania) are co-operative 
state/dom estic social sector ones and meld state, social sector institution and user resources. 
Analogously user fees can have a secondary role to  play, especially in cases in which benefits 
are imm ediate and costs o f  present alternative supplies can be redeployed as user fees (e.g. 
w ater, but also health and education where relatively high cost/low  efficiency services have 
been purchased primarily because no decent quality public sector ones were to hand).
To insist on a state monopoly - including banning amenity services provided at full cost in the 
private sector - is rather blindly ideological (especially when the banned include the dom estic 
social sector). But to  insist on primarily private and/or user fee financed provision is 
either rem arkably unobservant and analytically inept or based on the ultra ideological 
premise that universal access to basic services as a medium term goal is not a priority -
i.e. that poor people do not matter. That is to  deny the political economy and moral 
econom y principle that no society can be great and prosperous the majority o f  whose people 
are poor and miserable, a proposition central to  the w ork o f  socially concerned conservative 
econom ists such as Adam Smith.
U n i v e r s a l  A c c e s s : S o m e  G e n d e r  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s
It may be useful to  note the gender implications of a universal access approach strategy:
1. universal access is disproportionately favourable to those initially disproportionately 
excluded - i.e. to wom en and girl children in almost all SSA cases;
2. household health and w ater services are almost entirely on the female side o f  African 
household (cultural) divisions o f  labour except in respect to initial facility building which is 
primarily on the male side. Therefore, universal access in these sectors (including less 
distance to  facilities) does reduce wom en's and girl's - workload and facilitate better ow n 
health, child care, nutrition, environmental sanitation and educational attendance;
3. because provision and m aintenance in respect to  w ater and nutrition are seen as primarily 
female responsibilities, user com m ittees are often seen as logically dominantly female. 
Because men do value water, food and healthy children, success by women in running
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such com m ittees improves their status both directly and (probably) by increasing their 
access to  other leadership posts.
Those points suggest the im portance o f  mainstreaming gender issues. Som e public services 
are particularly im portant to wom en and universal access is generally em pow ering for them.
To ignore those realities is not to  be "gender blind" but gender biased - how ever 
unintentionally. And some program m es to  be user friendly to  wom en need to  be different 
from those for men because their tasks are different - e.g. it makes little sense to  teach w ater 
m aintenance or weeding to  men if wom en in fact do the work. If  w om en farm ers have 
different crop and work patterns than men, it is no more sensible to  have identical program m es 
for men and wom en than for - say - pastoralists, mixed farmers, annual crop  g row ers and tree 
cropping farmers.
But by the same token separate women's program mes appear an unsound general approach.
In practice they will be marginalised and weak. And the agricultural analogy applies - a 
separate ministry o f  w om en's agriculture is as sensible as a set o f  separate m inistries for 
livestock, tree cropping, irrigated farming, mixed farming and rainfed annual cropping.
For the avoidance o f  doubt it is not being argued that gender tensions o r inequities are unique 
to  Africa. They are universal. How ever, forms and priorities vary. This is graphically 
illustrated by the final infuriated retort o f  a South African enforced rural resident w om an at a 
gender conference in the UK to her persistent northern feminist 'supporters ' - "But you just 
don't understand. I don't w ant to  know how to get rid o f  my husband. W hat I w ant is to be 
legally and financially able to  live together with him and our children".
The gender aspects increase the case for public sector provision since equity  and universal 
access plus external econom ies (econom ic and social) are involved which could hardly be 
pursued (o r the gains from  them captured) by a private, 'for profit' enterprise. As m ore 
generally the case for user-dom estic social sector-state partnership is strong  in respect to 
gender aspects.
B a s ic  S e r v i c e s  a n d  B a s ic  C a d r e s
The professionals, para-professionals and skilled workers/artisans providing these basic 
services com prise over half the non-military public service in virtually all SSA  countries and 
around three-quarters in most. Indeed, in some - e.g. Mali, E thiopia - prim ary school teachers 
alone are virtually half. In most cases the second largest cadre is that o f  nurses and health 
para-professionals and the third civilian police. It is rare for these th ree g roups o f  field level 
basic service providers not to add up to  half the public service. For exam ple, in Tanzania they
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are 100,000, 50,000 and 25,000 respectively o f  a total o f  325,000 and in M ozam bique 40,000, 
15,000 and 7,500 o f  110,000.
III.
W H Y  TH E 1980-95 DECLINE AFTER  1960-79 IM PRO VEM ENT?
O ver 1960-79 many - not all - African public services improved in range o f  services provided 
and num bers served; to  a degree in quality o f  services and o f  bureaucratic procedures; 
m arkedly in range and depth o f  analysis and advice to  decision takers as well as in average 
levels o f  training and experience. To view 1960-79 (or the first post colonial period for 
countries w hose independence dates to  the late 1960s through 1980) as a golden age would be 
rom antic - there w ere plenty o f  limitations and exceptions even then and, as subsequently 
dem onstrated, w hat was achieved was all too  fragile and readily reversed. N onetheless, the 
overall trend was upward and forward and nothing in the 1960-79 record gives a basis for 
projecting either the scope or the scale o f  1980-95 deterioration and decline.
Judging from  expenditure data adjusted for price changes, SSA government spending per 
capita on basic services has fallen 40% since 1979. Adjusting for quality deterioration 
suggests a real per capita fall in average basic service availability in the 40% to 50%  
range. In practice this average understates the fall in m ost (not all) poorer countries and to 
m ost poor households in poorer and less poor countries. Budget curtailment has been m ost 
severe in poorer countries while, with a few exceptions, basic service deterioration has been 
greatest in outlying rural areas and small tow ns and failure to  expand to  match population 
grow th m ost m arked in peri urban areas whose urban newcom er populations are dom inantly 
poor.
Parallel to the decline in real expenditure and causally linked to service delivery deterioration 
in quality, accessibility to  poor households and - less markedly - absolute quantity have been 
falls in real remuneration o f  public servants. These have rarely (econom ic success cases 
like B otsw ana, M auritius, Seychelles, are exceptions as are 'buy in' form er settler ruled 
territory agreem ents preserving or limiting falls in real white official wages but evening up 
those o f  African public servants) been less than 50% and in some cases appear to exceed 
80%. For example, in Ethiopia, nominal public service pay scales had been static for tw o 
decades prior to  1993 reforms.
The falls in per capita resource allocation and in real pay to public servants are clearly  
the dom inant causes of public service and public services declines The falls in turn are 
largely the result o f  sustained economic unsuccess. That constraint has been accentuated by -
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largely external - ideological pressures to cut both public service em olum ents and numbers 
parallel to  responses - both dom estic and external - to  fiscal exigencies (including increased 
debt service and - often - defence demands as well as revenue squeezes often related to 
collapsed real em olum ents o f  tax collectors) leading to constricting the largest chunk (usually 
30%  to  35% ) o f  public spending, the civilian payroll.
H ow ever, in assessing both the present crises confronting most SSA public services and the 
reasons for decline - to  identify ways to  achieve turnarounds not to  allocate blame - m ore 
articulated identification o f  causal factors is useful.
St e p s  o n  a D o w n w a r d  Pa t h
Numbers o f  basic service providers are seriously inadequate. In m ost countries they peaked 
in the late 1970s o r early 1980s and have declined since - while populations have risen on 
average by 40% . In Tanzania, for example, total central and local governm ent public service 
employment was o f  the order o f  350,000 in 1974 and 320,000 in 1995 while population had 
risen by about three-quarters. Even allowing for reallocation (heavily away from an - 
admittedly inefficient - field level set o f  agricultural extension and research services and a large 
cadre o f  non-functional form er local tax collectors) the implications for primary and adult 
education and especially health, w ater and roads are dire.
Mali illustrates how inadequate the numbers can be in primary education. To provide 
universal access with a maximum o f  40 students per class (an average o f  35 given population 
dispersion in much o f  the country) would require five times the present primary teacher cadre 
which is half the public service. In health, M ozam bique with 16,000,000 people, has 19,000 
health personnel, versus 55,000 for under 30,000,000 in Tanzania, which (with m ajor 
retraining and som e reallocation) probably has about the minimum level required for universal 
primary health service access.
It is quite true that employees surplus to requirements - largely messengers, cleaners, 
drivers, cooks, bottle w ashers and jun ior clerks - are on most payrolls in SSA (as elsewhere). 
But a reasoned estim ate can hardly exceed 5% on average and their share o f  the payroll 2%.
To concentrate on this to  the exclusion o f  the glaring shortages is hardly a route to  public 
service reform  if reform  is intended to enhance delivery. Nor is it evident that massive 
retrenchm ent program m es whose gestation, conflict and morale costs are high (and which 
usually lead to  severance and training payments wiping out two to three years fiscal savings) 
are m ore efficient than enforced non-rehiring on retirement, dismissal or departure which over 
10 years could cut employment in the surplus prone cadres 25% to 40%. The exception to  
this rule is "ghost" w orkers which are substantial in some services and should be exorcised 
prom ptly on probity and professional as well as fiscal grounds.
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Similarly, many basic service providers - quite possibly half - either lack adequate initial 
training or are long overdue for retraining and/or refresher and upgrading courses. And 
am ong them  are some unsuitable holders of necessary posts But in these cases retraining  
and/or replacement, not net reductions are needed. Training adequacy - in quantity, 
quality and date is a m ajor cause o f  decline. Training budgets have frequently been butchered 
o f  muscle, not merely trimmed o f  fat. Many Tanzanian primary health care w orkers have not 
had updating training for well over a decade while knowledge in respect to PHC (especially in 
respect to  prevention, education and relationships with users and user groups) has changed 
radically over that period Perhaps a quarter o f  M ozambican primary school teachers have so 
limited a know ledge base (including lack o f  a w orking knowledge o f  the language o f  
instruction) that replacem ent - not retraining - may be needed.
Bureaucracy - in the sense o f  routinising the routine and allowing implementation to  be 
decentralised, prom pt and by field level officers - has deteriorated. In areas as varied as 
primary textbook delivery and allocation o f  mobility (vehicles and fuel), known, standardised 
procedures operated  at base level on delegated authority have often eroded to  the point o f  
disappearance. Referral up to clog senior personnel's desks with myriads o f  micro actions, 
inconsistent (and often patently inefficient) decisions at field level and - perhaps m ost 
comm only - neither referring nor acting (i.e. not attempting to get the job done) do nothing 
for service delivery or public service reputation (or morale).
Com plementary resource constraints limit the effectiveness o f competent staff in place and 
seeking to  do their best. Lack o f  drugs, texts, mobility, spare parts, basic furniture and 
equipm ent, training - the litany o f  w oes is all too well known to anyone who has talked to  field 
level - and indeed to operating ministry national director - level. "Give us the tools and we'll 
do the job" may be too  simplistic, but "G ive'us too  few, too decrepit tools and we cannot do 
the job" is a statem ent o f  fact.
Pay levels prevent a majority o f  public servants from working full time on public 
business unless they charge generalised, privatised user fees of one variety or another
This is not a m atter o f  morality or greed but o f  necessity - often dire necessity. In a m ajority 
o f  SSA public services primary school teachers and similar level professionals are paid 30%  to 
35%  o f  household o f  six absolute poverty line budgetary requirements. Even allowing for 
income o f  o ther household m em bers 50%  would appear to be the short term floor - and 
662/3%  the medium term  target - to  make possible full time public service without private user 
fees collected by public servants for their own use.
To argue that these pay levels are set by market forces is either an absurdity or an 
obscenity The state is in these m arkets a dominant oligopsonist to a near m onopsonist 
Com parable private sector wages by middle and large enterprises tend to be 2 to 5 times
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as high (and aid agency including UNDP/UN in the 6 to 8 times range). The form er are set 
by w hat employers think prudent to achieve w orker probity and productivity and the latter by 
w hat agency personnel consider minimum socially decent pay levels for local staff under local 
conditions. True, governm ents can pay lower emoluments and keep many staff (usually not 
the best) but only because private sector opportunities are quantitatively limited, 30%  o f  needs 
is better than a risk o f  0%  and coping mechanisms fill the gap. W hat none o f  these provide 
are efficiency, m otivation and probity. Further, the dem onstration effects o f  governm ent as 
grossly exploitative employer are presumably socially and economically negative.
Coping (perhaps better styled survival tactics) keeps public servants, and their households, 
alive and most in post. But almost all variants corrode performance, probity and m orale even 
if in their absence perform ance would often be even worse because many would perforce exit 
the public service:
a. non-attendance at work - from frequent lateness and absenteeism to "ghost w orking" is a 
dominant elem ent in coping - to  free tim e to  earn elsewhere; as is
b. non-performance o f  public duties while at workplace, because engaging in private 
earning; often
c. using public facilities (e.g. com puters) and materials (e.g. vehicle spares) to  carry on 
private business; and/or
d. charging privatised, generalised, decentralised user fees (e.g. for stamping and posting 
letters, allowing past reception, hearing lectures key to passing exams, gaining access to 
primary health care or to  bedpans in hospitals) which has become ubiquitous in many 
countries; verging into
e. corruption proper (e.g. charging vehicle/driving fines at half rate, off-the-record and into- 
the-pocket or splitting tax due, perhaps one-quarter - one half to Treasury, 'collector' and 
payer); but also
f. exodus - at one stage half o f  all qualified Ghanaian teachers from primary level up, w ere 
w orking outside Ghana, three-fifths to  tw o-thirds o f  M ozambique's citizentertiary 
graduates now w ork abroad (many at sub-professional levels); while
g. other family members - including children - are required (by necessity not patriarchy) to  
earn more and avoidable expenses (including time for attending classes and going to  
clinics) are cut out.
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W ar (or violent, generalised, continuing social disorder) destroys physical assets, engrosses 
resources (including trained personnel), diverts attention, poses physical threats to  public 
service personnel (especially in rural areas) and blocks or at least ham pers access for service 
delivery. For example, in M ozam bique and Angola, about three-quarters o f  basic health and 
education facilities were dam aged, destroyed and/or abandoned at least once in the 1980s. In 
Ethiopia, the "peace dividend" - reallocation o f  about three-quarters o f  the form er 'Defence' 
Budget has been enough to  finance a near doubling o f  public service real wages. Collapse into 
near anarchy - e.g. Somalia, Liberia - evidently involves the near liquidation o f  public services 
in both senses. Neither a safe context nor resources exist. The most serious long term  
economic - and fiscal - effect is the lo»s o f  output base as a result o f  investm ent - physical and 
human - not made. In 1990, M ozam bique's output was less than half o f  w hat it probably 
would have been in the absence o f  w ar and Tanzania's (despite having m anaged to  avert 
significant fighting on its own soil except for the 1987 Amin invasion) at least 25%  lower.
Even restored grow th is, and continues to  be, from a lower base. This loss is magnified if  a 
weak public service - at analytical and policy and/or at basic service delivery levels - retards 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and renewal o f  livelihoods, infrastructure and basic services.
Corruption w hether from  need or greed erodes quality and increases cost decision taking and 
o f  implementation. It also corrodes the morale (and erodes the probity) o f  honest public 
servants. W hen systemic it can virtually totally destroy both probity and professionalism  with 
massive negative effects on quality and quantity o f  services. Systemic corruption, once 
entrenched, is hard to  reverse especially when the dominant ethos (even if criticised) has been 
that the basic purpose o f  public office is private gain. Among less poor countries, N igeria, 
Zaire and Liberia, and am ong very poor, Sierra Leone, illustrate this pathology.
It is necessary to  accept that corruption is not everywhere and always incom patible with the 
continued existence or even em ergence o f  a professional, com petent public service. K orea in 
the 1960-90 period and the UK in the first half o f  the 19th Century illustrate these tw o  points. 
How ever, both seem to suggest that the kind o f  corruption matters. In the UK corruption was 
apparently primarily a user fee to speed up delivery o f  services to which the briber had some 
claim or a screening device am ong multiple candidates which did not directly d istort m acro 
patterns o f  decisions. In K orea it appears to  have been m ore an ex post tax (dom inantly by 
political decision takers not public servants) on beneficiaries o f  decisions taken  on public 
policy criteria and professional advice. Those patterns are morally undesirable and cost 
raising, but - unlike the many cases in Africa in which the bribe leads to  the decision - do not 
necessarily distort patterns o f  decision taking. The difference is im portant but narrow ; 
widespread corruption o f  any kind places decision takers and officials on the slippery slope to 
the nadir in which maximisation o f  bribes becom es the chief strategic principle in selecting
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decisions to be made as well as o f'partners ' to  whom  to award contracts, concessions or other 
resource tlows.
V iolent oppression is destructive - whatever the pay levels - especially when it is arbitrary and 
unpredictable. Public servants cannot operate professionally and - in the context o f  apparently 
capricious action - cannot safely operate at all. U ganda under Amin and the Central African 
Em pire are illustrative. As in the war case, exodus o f  public servants as refugees or to  safer 
jobs abroad is frequently large.
Politicisation in respect to dam age to  the public service is usually a synonym or prettification 
o f  corruption, war and/or oppression. W hile political interference in day to day decisions in an 
arbitrary manner can - by destroying predictability and preventing professionalism - be 
severely damaging cases in the absence o f  systemic corruption, oppression and war do not 
seem to exist in SSA. It is true that participatory, decentralised democracy or quasi 
dem ocracy can constrain public servants (especially at policy advising and senior 
administrative level) simply by being unpredictable and threatening - even though not 
inherently im proper - but this does not appear to  be a major causal factor even in cases - e.g. 
Tanzania, M ozam bique, Ghana - cited as examples and in others - e.g. Kenya - it would be 
simpler to  describe the interference as enforcem ent or corruption and oppression.
Culture conflict is indeed a factor in public service weakening but not in the sense o f  a clash 
betw een an inherently 'N orth-w estern ' public service and an inherently 'African' social and/or 
political culture. Cultural clashes betw een order and professionalism and arbitrariness and 
personalised intervention do exist as do those betw een serving the public and using (abusing) 
public office for personal gain. But the clashes are intra African in SSA just as they are intra 
European in Europe. Indeed some - e.g. the culture o f'need  to know' versus that o f 'd u ty  to  
be accountable' are often within public services and not closely associated with attainm ent o f  
reasonable levels o f  perform ance and professionalism. Sweden's public sector openness and 
Britain's official culture o f  secrecy have both proven compatible with com petent public 
administration and service delivery.
External domination/domestic loss of self-confidence (and in some cases self-respect) are 
initially consequences o f  decline but once entrenched feed back as causes in a decapacitating 
dynamic. The creation - usually in the hope o f  short run delivery gains - o f  a plethora o f  
parallel service delivery channels (bilateral, international, external NGO) is cost inefficient, 
public service and dom estic social sector debilitating by diversion o f  resources and even m ore 
debilitating because o f  the loss o f  external, user and public servant confidence in the public 
service. Frequently - mostly notably in M ozam bique - it exacerbates decapacitation, thereby 
becom ing a major part o f  the problem to  which it purports to be an answer. Analogously the 
flood o f  expatriate personnel w hether advisory, nominally in public service posts or in
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externally run public sector quangos (e.g. many World Bank project m anagers/projects) are 
ultimately dynamically problem deepening in ways more selective support for dom estic 
institutions is not. M any o f  the personnel replace public servants driven out (or rendered 
ineffectual) by collapse o f  em olum ents and complementary resources. O thers have such 
limited contextual knowledge as to  provide exceedingly ill-conceived advice and to  create real 
culture clashes (tem porary, external advisors not bearing consequences o f  decisions versus 
perm anent domestic public servants who have to live with them). In general - even when 
com petent, concerned and informed - if  they come to dominate, or to  be seen to dominate, 
decision taking they decapacitate dom estic analytical and advisory capacity, self-confidence 
and morale. This is the case even if  the reverse is intended. By m aking the dom estic be seen 
as inferior and efforts to produce independent advice and analysis (let alone strategy) 
pointless, they 'capacitate' only cultures o f  dependence, self-doubt and bitter resentment. 
Hardly surprisingly they - and dom estic decision takers seen to  be "in their pockets" - are 
frequently the last to  be aw are o f  these dynamics even if  senior public servants and dom estic 
social sector personnel (and often a few expatriates perceived as "on our side") feel them  only 
too  clearly. The problem is not primarily advice or criticism - it is advice and criticism  
seen as not open to reasoned dialogue and systematically backed by financial sanctions  
M ore welcome expatriates, agencies and N G O s are by no means uniformly less forceful in 
expressing ideas, proffering advice or criticising, but are usually m uch m ore listening and open 
to  dialogue and virtually never are in comm and o f  financial big battalions.
IV. 
CU LT U R ES A N D VA LU ES IN CO NFLICT AND TENSIO N
Clearly, any institution will function imperfectly if  it is in violent conflict with the cultures in 
which it operates and whose members it is supposed to  serve and especially if its internal 
culture is in radical conflict with the non-w orkplace cultures o f  m ost o f  those who staff it. 
How ever, to set up public services and African culture as inherently contradictory  is simplistic 
in the extreme.
Cultures are plural, varied and overlapping To speak o f  African culture is not unrealistic 
in certain respects so long as it is recognised that it is equally true to  speak o f  African cultures 
which are by no means identical. Indeed if one ran a range o f  African cultures from  that o f  the 
remnant hunter gatherer San o f  the Kalahari to the middle class black urban culture o f  
Johannesburg and from Cockney London to  the near medieval peasant farm ing plus migrant 
labour o f  Tras os M ontes in Portugal on certain bases some African cultures would be closer 
to some European than to the m ost different African and vice versa.
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I he pluralism - at least in the late 20th Century - applies to most persons too - household, 
religious, socio-political and workplace cultures (and behaviour patterns) are not identical. It 
is true  that less technological, less mobile, m ore nearly unitary cultures in which household 
lineage, religion and governance com prise a nearly seamless whole have existed historically, 
but few  survive in that form today in SSA or anywhere else.
Further, cultures change This is not surprising as they are human constructs and the 
possibilities and the aspirations o f  human groups change over time. Both multiple 
overlapping cultures and change (especially rapid change) do create cultural (and other) 
tensions. Ability to  change - preferably pro-actively and endogenously - is under most 
circum stances a sine qua nun for the continued strength o f  a culture. The exceptions are 
largely small, socially complex, technologically simple, resource constrained isolated 
com m unity cultures - e.g. the San cited earlier and the small hunter gatherers o f  the 
Zaire/U ganda border m ountains and rain forests. These cultures tend not to transform  
endogenously and to collapse tragically rather than adapt in changing contexts.
Certain general sets o f  tensions (or open conflicts - i .e. unm anageable or ill-managed tensions) 
can be identified:
a. urban/rural - based on the m ore mobile, looser linkages possible, functional andor 
desired in urban (and m odern large scale farming) areas than in small family farming plus 
supporting occupation based rural areas. Because m ore recent and subject to  more 
pressures for change, African urban cultures are often w eaker than rural (not that this is 
uniquely African - inner city cultural decay, rather than transform ation or even adjustment, 
is very m arked in the North);
b. pastoralist/cropping - especially w hen'the form er are quasi nomadic. African public 
services have in general done a poor job o f  adapting basic services delivery to  meet 
nom adic group needs and a w orse one o f  providing user friendly access to  w ater and 
drought year reserve pastures (both o f  which tend to be engrossed by sedentary croppers). 
Since pastoralists do pay indirect taxes and licenses and believe governance should serve 
them, they are aggrieved. Arguably, the roots o f  conflict in Mali are not so much ethnic as 
nom adic pastoralist (Tuareg) perception that they are getting a raw  deal;
c. Ethnic - while interlocked with econom ic (as in pastoralist/cropper cases), frequently 
m isunderstood (e.g. Inkatha and its m ost bitter enemies are both Zulu - one largely the 
heirs o f  the Zulu Em pire and the other descendants o f  Zulu who had fled from its advance) 
as well as m anipulated (as Belgium - not always intentionally - did in respect to H utu/Tutsi 
relationships) do have a clear reality especially in times o f  great stress. Bosnia, Chechnya,
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East T im or all illustrate this arena or vehicle o f  cleavage and conflict ju st as much as do 
Liberia and Zaire
Arguably, som e cultures place m ore stress on the person in society (in the context o f  inter 
personal and inter basic group relations) and others on the individual Historically this is a 
differentiation on which most o f  Africa and parts o f  Asia do diverge from  E urope and the 
Americas. How ever, these differences are rarely binary - either/or - but usually a matter  
of  degree. Possibly that too  is an area o f  historic divergence Asian (as in the yin/yang 
interpenetration symbol) and African cultures (som e - e.g. the Akan - with similar symbols) 
usually have in practice built in m ore complexity (and perhaps balance), and European more 
binariness and individualism.
A n d  P u b l ic  S e r v ic e s
Pre colonial African states - as noted - did not have large public services. This is quite 
different from  saying that they were not really states - though some w ere very small, limited 
and inchoate.
M ost did have an executive (usually a king plus advisors-counsellors-adm inistrators-generals), 
some representative elements (e.g. age groups, lineage heads, elders, religious leaders), a 
security function (usually undifferentiated military/police), revenue collection services, a 
body o f  laws and enforceable custom s with some forms o f  judicial process and local 
administration W hat they lacked - as did Europe until the 19th C entury  - w as a large cadre 
o f  specialised mass service delivery officials. Health and education services w ere certainly not 
unknown, but w ere much less specialised than today and their provision w as much less 
perceived as part o f  the governance function. In that sense colonial (not that m ass service 
provision played much part in them until the twilight years o f  the colonial era!) and post 
colonial public services do represent a new culture.
M any o f  the problem s in African public services ascribed to culture probably relate to  this 
novelty. The w orkplace culture o f  even a user friendly, efficiently bureaucratic  public service 
is not (one hopes) identical to  that o f  any household or family. U nderstanding and adapting to 
these differences takes time for individuals and cultures.
M ore specifically, one is tem pted to  argue that the notably weak record  and file keeping, as 
well as com m unication answering, characterising almost all African public services may be a 
result o f  the dominantly verbal and face to  face nature o f  historic African cultures. One 
objection to  this reading is obvious. Egyptian and Sudanese states have had w ritten records 
and - at least at elite and governm ent official levels - recorded as well as face to  face verbal 
cultures for at least 3,000 years, but are not notably better at record keeping or
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com m unication. And per contra lack o f  historic memory (exacerbated by weak files and 
archives) is ram pant in African public services - surprisingly in the context o f  cultures in which 
oral tradition has been important. This may be the price o f  a rather over enthusiastic 
im portation o f  the European (especially the British) public service culture o f  frequent post, 
substance and location shifts o f  personnel.
That said, the supposed 'un-African' features o f  public services tend to disintegrate on 
examination:
1 large scale analytical, communication and data handling and basic service delivery
functions are new elements with which pre-19th Century European and pre-colonial 
African cultures and governance structures had little or no experience. While cultural and 
o ther contextual elem ents require secondary - and occasionally major - variations, the 
functions and their scale do impose certain param eters on effective ways o f  dealing with 
them. These are com m on constraints in Ghana and Canada, the UK and Sri Lanka, 
Singapore and South Africa and ignoring or violating (whether negligently, corruptly  or 
dictatorially) them  decapacitates and corrodes both the public service and public services.
2. As principles, delegation, decentralisation, standard procedures and user
accountability are not alien to Africans nor to most African cultures. M any pre­
colonial African states w ere substantially decentralised - certainly the larger ones had to  be 
given distances and com m unications technology. Some powers were delegated but some 
w ere effectively vested in local officials and in bodies - e.g. age groups, religious g roups - 
outside the central executive. In at least some systems failing officials and counsellors 
(civil as well as military) w ere dismissed (som etimes with more extreme prejudice than a 
m odern public service term ination) and 'user' views played a part in such actions.
Similarly, kings, om anhenes and other rulers were frequently both hereditary and electoral 
(choice from  a lineage or family but indirectly elected within that range) and im peachm ent 
(in the evocative W est African forest term, "destooling", and the rather more om inous 
savannah one "deskinning"). Certainly m odern Civil Service Commissions and multi party 
elections (indeed standing parties as such) were unknown, but the principles to  which they 
are means w ere know n and often practised. Certainly practice was often imperfect and 
sometim es absent, but the same can be said o f  Civil Service Commissions and o f  multi 
party elections in all continents.
3 Political Policy Decisions, Service Delivery Articulation and Implementation
universally (not only in Africa) produce tensions. It is public, servants business to  advise, 
to produce options, to  present data to inform decisions and to accept and seek to
implement decisions in good faith or to resign. Public servants should not aspire to  being 
undercover Platonic guardians ventriloquising political decision takers. Tensions are
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greater (and less likely to be creative) when the decision takers have little claim to political 
legitimacy or com petence. How ever, action to restore legitimate governm ent is not (and 
cannot be) a public service function even if persons who are public servants may feel (and 
be) obligated to  undertake it in their personal or cultural group capacities. On articulation 
and implem entation (operational means as contrasted with strategic ends) public servants 
can - and should - be proactive and emphatic. With competent decision takers they will 
usually be given a serious hearing if (and only if) they clearly do accept the decision and 
indicate how it could be implemented (not just that the M inister's m eans w on't w ork!). 
Clearly there are always tensions and occasionally conflicts but in w orkable system s o f  
legitimate political decision, takers and professional public servants these are resolvable 
and can even be creative. M walimu Nyerere once remarked that on a m ajor policy 
decision it was the tw o civil servants who had advised forcefully against it (and achieved 
revisions) who had also taken the lead in articulating ways to  carry it out which could 
achieve intended gains and minimise the costs they felt should have led to  a different 
decision because they (the officials) clearly felt both halves were their professional duty. 
That is not an optimal resolution - neither he nor they had achieved an agreed position on 
the decision - but public policy dialogue and implementation had been carried out 
rationally and professionally.
4. "Open objective criteria" versus "old boy networks" is a universal - not a uniquely 
African - source o f  tension. There is a need for a certain degree o f  com m on culture  
(including educational background and styles o f  interpersonal relations) within a public 
service. There is a valid case for senior policy advisory, articulating and adm inistering 
officials to  have broad sympathy with the overall objectives (even if  not necessarily all 
details timings or proposed means) o f  the political decision takers to  whom  they work. 
There are limitations to the information provided by standardised examination  
results and paper records The limitations of personalised, personal preference (or 
prejudice) related recruitm ent (not least in respect to  women) are also well known. 
Nominally wholly objective systems usually build in (not necessarily intentionally) cultural 
biases as do even independent, stylised interviews. Both objectivity and subjective  
personal judgem ent are needed; getting the balance right is difficult - in Africa as 
elsewhere.
5. Corruption is corruption and is no more African or conceptually difficult for Africans to 
understand and to recognise than for people o f  any other continent. N epotism , extortion 
and bribery do exist in Africa - as elsewhere - but have never been general African values. 
To assert the contrary is an expression o f  despair, o f  denigration, o r o f  self-exculpation.
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6 Repressive dictatorships are repressive dictatorships. Historically they have neither 
been uncom m on nor the norm in Africa (or anywhere else). Exclusion from decision 
taking, oppression and state violence are not beloved o f  nor acceptable to  African peoples, 
even if  at times they have been endured. The recurrent crises in certain pre-colonial 
African states with personalised, inherently violent, quasi totalitarian governance (e.g. the 
Zulu Em pire and Abomey Kingdom) strongly suggest the reverse. Again the advocates o f  
this thesis are usually either despairing, beneficiaries or external observers out to  justify 
their attitudes tow ard Africa and Africans or to  use Africa as a symbol o f  impending 
generalised, global chaos.
The last tw o points should serve as a warning against accepting "African culture" as a reason 
for rejecting public services on guidelines and with param eters not fundamentally different 
from those o f  Singapore or Taiwan, the USA or the UK - or for accepting 'guided one party 
systems' which are in fact mal-guided, no party, dictatorships. It is necessary to ask "qui 
bono" (who gains) from the contention, if  it is accepted, and why it is being put. All too  often 
'authenticite' is the last defence o f  a scoundrel seeking to  justify the unjustifiable.
There are plenty o f  cases o f  expressed desires o f  ordinary Africans and o f  African public 
servants to  achieve - o r regain - public services and governance patterns which in broad term s 
(if not necessarily in secondary features) would be perfectly recognisable to public 
administration and governance analysts and practitioners in the North (or Asia). The now  
largely domestically driven civil service reform  programmes o f Ghana and Tanzania fall into 
this pattern. The totally internally generated (and rather faster moving) Ethiopian one is very 
much about regaining what was found and lost and now must be sought and won back under 
unpropitious resource availability circumstances. The same is true in Somaliland where the 
'authentic African' official system o f  Siad Barre is dismissed with contempt and the necessary 
first step is seen as recreating the public service and public services which had begun to 
emerge in the twilight o f  British rule over 1947-60. The memory o f  the law and order, health, 
education, water, veterinary services, basic infrastructure capacity o f  that period (even if 
surely som ewhat romantically rem embered because o f  the mounting 1960-1991 dynamic o f  
disaster) is one o f  the driving elem ents o f  "The Somaliland Idea".
Africans have fo r at least half a century increasingly demanded basic services Som e 
governm ents have - not unsuccessfully in popular legitimacy and re-electability term s - m ade 
their delivery a central strategic goal. Botswana, M auritius and Tanzania are historic 
examples and the new Ethiopian governm ent - like that o f  Mozambique - seems set on the 
same trajectory. W hai services are dem anded and what quality is perceived as minimally 
acceptable varies with know ledge and past experience. Somalians (not Somalilanders 
however) do not, judging by a research study, realise health is a service the governm ent can be
24
expected to provide. Probably the basic reason is that in Somalia (but not Somaliland) it never 
has in practice done so. V eterinary and w ater services - which were at one time provided 
relatively widely - are expected. Tanzanians have remarkably firm (and broad ranging over the 
whole range o f  basic services cited earlier) expectations and views as to  acceptable quality. 
Both the political culture (not just the views o f  Mwalimu Nyerere) and 1960-1980 
developm ents built that cultural characteristic. And in the context o f  relatively accountable 
governance (with frequent reposting o f  officials and defeat o f  politicians w ho w ere seen as 
unaccountable) that cultural expectation has enforced real (and by no m eans totally 
unsuccessful) effort to maintain - and in some areas, e.g. vaccination, nutrition - extend and 
transform  basic services during over a decade and a half o f  extreme overall and fiscal resource 
constraints. The idea that bureaucracy to  ensure replacement seed corn reached senior female 
household members via a jo int state-church effort in refugee impacted N gara D istrict or that 
the police around the huge (and internally violent) refugee camps and the army forces 
watching the border to  keep Rwandaise violence in Rw anda were un-African external imports 
which should be rejected would (once com prehended) be rejected by N garans with some 
vehemence, as opposition political parties trying to campaign on those them es in the 1994 
local governm ent elections discovered. The Ngarans clearly believed in public services from 
public servants and the public service operated on the basis that it was its duty to 
provide them. Arguably, Tanzania is atypical. W hat is assuredly not, is un-African
V.
EL EM EN TS T O W A R D  W A Y S FO RW A RD
Public service reconstruction and revival for the provision o f  public services as a part o f  
improved governance is hardly in itself a controversial objective. D isputes - it w ould be 
unwise to style some as dialogues - turn on role, timing and key elements.
Three key elements are in large part beyond public service reform - o r at any rate larger than it 
- although it is at the least a significant contributing element to their success, o r failure:
1. Peace and security require an end to (and avoidance o f  future) war. To a limited extent 
this depends on military forces: e.g. Tanzania's keeping violence across its W estern 
borders from spilling over for 35 years with only tw o major incidents and one substantial 
failure. To a much greater one it turns on political negotiations (w ith success apparently 
partly contingent on fatigue and a mutual belief neither can win the w ar and each can win 
in peace). Public services are relevant afterw ard to w inning-deepening-preserving peace, 
especially because w ars w eaken civil police and magistracy and often leave a culture o f
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disorder and/or a rising tide o f  crime partly explained by loss o f  societal cohesion pressure 
o f  w ar and partly by "demobilised guns" with users and com batants without jobs.
2. a cc o u n ta b le  governan ce  including access to data to call to account and processes to  re- 
elect/de-elect, prom ote/dism iss is also not primarily a product o f  the public service. 
H ow ever, producing accounts (which are one key element in accountability) and the 
physical running o f  elections are public service functions and ones in which 
professionalism  is critical if either accounts or electoral processes are to be credible In this 
case professional has tw o senses: com petent (accounts can be an 'honest' mess as can 
election arrangem ents) and independent o f  the wishes o f  interested parties where these 
conflict with the public interest.
3. econom ic - inc lud ing  overall ou tp ut ,  external accoun t and fiscal - stability and at least 
m odest grow th adequate to m ount a public service and public services in a developm ent 
strategy national project. This is what structural adjustment should achieve and econom ic 
good housekeeping preserve. Again achieving and sustaining that condition requires both 
policy alternative analysis, preparation and m onitoring and basic service (tax collection in 
particular) capacity and integrity but is dependent on the nature o f  the political system not 
just com petence o f  public servants.
Beyond - and to  sustain - these broader conditions rehabilitation and renewed developm ent o f  
public services requires structural and transform ational public service reform. This is a 
medium term  continuing operation, not a sudden once for all cutting binge and - over tim e - is 
likely to  result in rises in total numbers and is certain to require increased real payrolls. A 
possible interim phase (or first step) to tackle pay-productiv ity-professionalism  during 
stabilisation and return to grow th may be prudent - it does feature in the Ethiopian though not 
the Ghanaian nor, to  date at least, Tanzanian exercises.
Pa y  - P r o d u c t i v i t y  - P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m : F ir st  St e p s
The three P's need to  be tackled in parallel. Present pay prevents professionalism and 
enforces reduced productivity. However, because o f  past erosion o f  attitudes and procedures 
and because there are fiscal limits on pay well beneath probable optimum levels pay 
restoration above could well be inadequate. Therefore productivity  requirem ents and  
professional career structures, qualification  and train ing schem es and procedures are 
needed at the same time as initiation o f  real incom e restoration:.
1. pay for all basic service providers should be raised to at least two-thirds the household 
absolute poverty line, i.e. $50 a month in countries such as Tanzania and M ozam bique 
with a probable SSA range o f  $40 (e.g. Ethiopia) to $100 (e.g. Mali, Cote d'Ivoire). A
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medium term  (5 to  7) year goal should be a minimum equal to the household absolute 
poverty line. It is quite absurd economically to suppose a lower pay scale for 
professionals crucial to  human investment and m acroeconom ic grow th  will send "the right 
signals" or get the right results. Present artificially (State/IFI collusion) pay is a clear 
example o f  wilfully "getting the prices wrong".
2. the range should be o f  the order o f  10:1, e.g. to  $500 a month if the base is $50;
3. allowances which are disguised salary should be cut out leaving only those which are 
reimbursement o f  actual w ork linked expenditures, plus - where long standing and widely 
accessible - continued bousing access at 10% to 20%  o f  base pay (usually set when this 
was a near econom ic rent);
4. privatised user fees should be eliminated or converted into user group funding o f  
additional expenditures including but not only pay supplements - e.g. at a rural school food 
for teachers, but also for noon feeding, and help with teachers' house m aintenance, but 
also with provision o f  desks, tables, cupboards (for teaching m aterials) and classroom  
repairs;
5. requiring (and monitoring) attendance at workplace and to work;
6. setting up simple productivity goals specific to  tasks, e.g. kilom etres o f  tertiary roads 
maintained per forem an-artisan team -road gang;
7. requiring public servants to  accept needed refresher, backup, upgrading training partly on 
released and partly on own time;
8. operating (unless clearly irrational) existing appointment-promotion-disciplinary  
provisions transparently to  begin reconstruction o f  professionalism  within the service and 
internalised by public servants.
P u b l ic  S e r v ic e  R e f o r m  Fo r  G o o d  G o v e r n a n c e
The previous proposals can be seen as the first stage o f  structural and transform ational public 
service reform but a first stage to be carried out - if at all possible - in parallel to  data 
collection, analysis and dialogue on the further stages. This is particularly true in cases in 
which some sectors p-p-p packages can be introduced m ore or less im m ediately but others 
may need to  follow with 1 or 2 years lag because no viable p-p-p package is now  to hand. 
Beyond tax services (because their rebuilding is vital to  sustain the overall exercise), which 
sectors should be stage 1 is a contextual matter. Ethiopia has chosen E ducation while any 
M ozambican exercise would surely include Health. Tanzania might well include civil police
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but to  do so in E thiopia would not be possible until a civil police ,service wholly separate from 
the arm y had been created (seen as a priority now in hand in Somaliland but not, to  date, in 
Ethiopia).
Again, the key elem ents and logical broad sequence are moderately easy to  identify - if tim e is 
used for reflection not wasted on false starts. M ost actual program m es have not followed 
them  or have com e back to them after wasting years rushing about at random down dead ends 
on the apparent principle 'Don't just stand there! Do something!! Fire someone!!!'.
The logical trajectory for public service reform does not begin with dismissing staff or 
reducing payrolls. Indeed, in one sense it begins outside the public service which - as its name 
suggests - is not a self-constituted and self-justified institution, but one to enable the state to 
provide public services. Therefore the logical sequence o f  planning reform is along the 
following lines:
1. What are State objectives? For example, does it seek to ensure law and order with 
access to police protection and to  a functioning magistracy? Is famine viewed as a m atter 
o f  national dishonour to be prevented by structures able to warn ahead o f  and to  mitigate 
the impact o f  drought? These goals can be broken down into articulated targets with 
dates for attainment. The next set o f  questions concerns:
2. W ho is to do what and by what instruments will the State act or influence actions?
At one extrem e it is unlikely a state would envisage privatising the courts and at the o ther 
that it would consider grow ing all food (or even all commercialised food) itself. Betw een 
these extremes, real choices among state operated; state financed but wholly or partially 
dom estic social sector or enterprise operated, state influenced by regulatory processes; 
state influenced by market m anagem ent'(including both the revenue and expenditure sides 
o f  fiscal policy). These can be articulated to  match policies and instrum ents/institutions to 
articulated goals and with parallel timings. From  this stage it is possible to determine:
3 How many public servants, with what qualifications are needed where to do what?
For example, if Universal Primary Education is a 20 year goal, 60%  enrolment a 5 year 
goal, 80%  a 10 year and 90%  a 15 year, it is possible to project numbers o f  teachers 
required on a geographically disaggregated basis. Assuming specified goals as to  content 
and quality, it is possible to  determ ine qualifications required. Comparing present num bers 
and qualifications provides a basis for projecting pre-entry, upgrading and refresher 
training numbers. This exercise can be repeated across the board, albeit views on num bers 
at analysis and policy design/articulation level are less technically constrained. A spin-off' 
at this stage is identification o f  surplus posts and post holders for retraining to  fill present 
and projected gaps (genuine redeployment), not replaced on retiring (or otherw ise leaving
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the service) or retrenchm ent. A more important - and time consum ing exercise - is 
identifying presently non-qualified staff needing retraining and irremediably non-qualifiable 
ones needing to  be redeployed or retrenched and to be replaced. T o make efficient use o f 
the personnel requires consideration o f :
4. W hat bureaucratic and other structures - including professional career patterns - 
are needed to facilitate productive efficiency? Efficiency here relates to  cost (whether 
in financial or personnel term s) per unit o f  output, e.g. students com pleting primary cycle, 
primary health care consultations. Care needs to  be taken to  define an output or proxy 
appropriately - arrests is not a good index o f  police efficiency nor patients discharged dead 
o f  hospital ou tput (even if both have been used as such in the UK in the not so distant 
past). Civil Service Commissions, Standing Orders, in-service training and prom otion 
procedures, personnel management and what used to be styled O and M (Organisation and 
M anagem ent) all fall into this category.
5. W hat em olum ents levels are necessary and prudent for efficient conduct o f  public 
business/efficient delivery o f  public services? Quite clearly pay so low as to  force 
coping is not cost efficient (nor does it create respect for the S tate as a moral entity 
fulfilling its duty as a decent employer). N or is low base pay cam ouflaged by opaque 
incentives - usually concentrated on those in a position to  m anufacture and approve their 
institution. Certain guides such as a 10 to  1 range and a floor o f  tw o-th irds o f  household 
absolute poverty budget have been suggested. Socially acceptable household budget 
standards and m edium/large enterprise pay levels for roughly com parable skills and 
responsibilities are useful guides - once the floor has been attained. At this stage the issue 
o f  incentives arises. These are not easy to formulate because they need:
a. to be based on measures beyond beneficiary manipulation (e.g. if  agricultural extension 
officers are given incentives related to hectares o f  a crop planted and also report the 
estim ated plantings, an escalation in reported hectarage quite unassociated with real 
will result - as happened for cotton in Uganda in the 1960s);
b. to  be tied to  a good proxy for desired output (e.g. number o f  patients seen or 
prescribed drugs is a weak proxy for this purpose because its use is likely to  lead to 
under-exam ination and over-prescription);
c. to  be visibly fair (e.g. cotton output would not have served well in the U ganda case 
because it was highly w eather dependent, nor would primary school com pletion exam 
results serve well given very different average pupil backgrounds am ong schools).
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Standard recorded annual evaluations, prom otion speed up (and efficiency bars, less 
onerous procedures for justifying retirement in the public interest could do a good deal 
as a first stage.
6 W hat levels o f  complementary resources are required? W ithout mobility (vehicles, 
spares, fuel, bicycles, in-house or hired repair facilities), field staff cannot deliver services. 
W ithout funds to cover out o f  pocket travel expenses reimbursements, they will not. 
W ithout vaccines, basic drugs, medical supplies, clinics with basic services and equipm ent, 
primary health services will be crippled. To articulate, quantify and add up (physically and 
financially) is tedious (not surprisingly as it is a shadow demand side present and 
perspective budgetary exercise) but poses no insuperable intellectual or m ethodological 
problems. But a final question remains:
7. How and over w h a t time period can it be financed? Clearly cost considerations must 
be addressed earlier than at this stage o f  the exercise. However, they should not be used 
in a way w'hich straight jackets and predeterm ines results. Probably a rough guideline 
ceiling based on present expenditure, plausible resource growth projections and some 
reallocation/efficiency gains should be procured early on, but used as a target not as a 
procrustean bed. W hen - and unfortunately it is when not if - this ceiling is broken, an 
iterative prioritisation, recalculation, trade-off process will be required. It should begin at 
question 1 not 4, 5, 6.
D ow ngrading some aims, rephasing others, spinning o ff all or part o f  some to the dom estic 
social sector is m ore likely to be efficient than to attem pt to keep all the targets in principle but 
to  resource each so inadequately as to waste much o f  what is available (as underpaym ent is 
currently doing with public service personnel capacity).
H ow ever, by the same token augm enting resources and using them more efficiently is 
better than cutting or deferring output targets Better tax collection, shifting half o f  
expatriate salary and external training technical assistance to domestic budget and institutional 
support, achieving external debt service writedowns, exorcising ghost workers, low er 
dom estic interest rates (and thus debt service), cutting military budgets rapidly and radically as 
peace is restored are ways which, cumulatively, could over five years double resources 
available for basic services/infrastructure/data collection-analysis-policy advice in m ost SSA 
economies.
N o t  Fa r e w e l l  B u t  Fa r e  Fo r w a r d
The lessons to be draw n from public service deterioration or even disintegration in m uch o f  
SSA over the past decade-and-a-half are bitter But they give no cause for despair. The
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reasons are perfectly identifiable, comprehensible and more than adequate to  'achieve' the 
observed results. W hat is surprising is the tenacity with which many public servants  
have tried to hold on to both the forms and the substance of a professional public  
service and the dem ands o f  many o f  the public that they do so W hen serious reform  
reconstruction, refinancing in a context o f  decreasing war/increasing household and national 
security and o f  at least minimally public purpose oriented, accountable governance have been 
attem pted and sustained, positive results have been observable.
Three key conditions for sustaining and generalising that recovery and pressing forw ard to  
new ground are:
1 using imports selectively, with pre-studied contextual adaptations. T here are today 
too  many parallel delivery services by donors and their NGOs as well as too  many 
technical assistance experts operating outside any nationally coordinated o r accountable 
context,
2. reasserting African Agendas which are contextual but equally are hard-headed (if 
hopefully soft-hearted) in respect to  analysis, argum entation and sustainability;
3. prioritising resources for priority purposes including public policy and deliver services 
to  the public.
It is perfectly valid to  say each o f  these goals will be hard to  attain. Equally, because m ost 
African states need net external resource transfers and all are globally marginal up to  barely 
secondary in both geopolitical and econom ic terms, reasoned com prom ises with external 
preferences and an "Argue Don't Shout" tough negotiating stance will be needed. In some 
cases at some times the result will be partial temporary failure. But not even to  try is to 
ensure failure and one may reasonably assume African cultures and African history will not be 
forgiving o f  those who do not try. Why should they be?
African cultures do embody the principles o f  service to others, o f  order, o f  predictability, o f  
fairness (equity) and o f  regard to the most unfortunate. These are the foundations for public 
services to  serve the public. Two 'cultures' - in Africa as elsewhere - cut against them. The 
first is the 'culture' o f  predatory politics which engenders despair and cynicism (w ith its 
concom itant 'principles' o f  "protect your own back" and "the devil take the hindm ost"). The 
second is the increasing 'culture' o f  exploiting the public servant which sends strong 
disincentive signals, degrades their image (who is not paid and, largely as a result, does not 
perform  is not respected). W hat one refuses to pay for one cannot expect to  get. It is these 
tw o 'cultures' o f  disintegration which have nothing specifically African about them
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which are the mortal enemies o f  building public services for serving the public in Africa  
today.
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